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# Acoustic Side-Channel Attack

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  1. arXiv

    A keyboard the attacker never heard still gives up its keystrokes: Decker cuts the cross-keyboard accuracy gap from about 40 points to under 18

    Acoustic side-channel attacks had been validated only with a single keyboard, a fixed microphone, a quiet room, and training and testing on the same device; on unseen keyboards, strong unimodal and multimodal baselines lose roughly forty accuracy points. Decker combines keyboard signature normalization, domain-adversarial disentanglement, supervised cross-keyboard contrastive alignment and acoustic style randomization in one training framework to learn embeddings that discriminate keys but stay invariant to keyboard and user, narrowing the cross-keyboard generalization gap to under eighteen points, and a language model then decodes over the top acoustic candidates to turn noisy key predictions into coherent text.

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