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# Provably Secure Linguistic Steganography

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  1. arXiv

    Language steganography drops the bit-exact requirement: STEALTH decodes every message across precisions, GPUs and even model families

    Provably secure linguistic steganography has assumed the receiver can reproduce the sender's token probabilities bit for bit, yet floating-point precision, quantization, GPU architecture, or scoring a text in one pass instead of token by token all break that premise. STEALTH samples each token with a keyed exponential race, so a probability mismatch flips only the token whose race is close, and a rateless spinal code decoded by beam search absorbs those flips. Across the Gemma, Llama and Qwen families, same-family receivers decoded every message at every precision, quantization level, smaller model size and on a second GPU, and cross-family receivers decoded every message tested.

  2. arXiv

    Tokenization ambiguity no longer sinks single-history steganography: coin projection keeps over 90% of string entropy at full vocabulary

    Provably secure linguistic steganography assumes the receiver recovers the sender's tokens, but a text channel delivers only text, and one text admits many tokenizations, so retokenizing can lose the message. SyncPool kept the distribution exact by encoding pools of prefix-related tokens, yet its capacity collapsed at full vocabulary as whitespace and UTF-8 lead-byte hubs merged subtrees. Coin projection fixes each prefix's stop decision with shared randomness and leaves only root and child choices to the coder; on 3–4B models in English, Chinese and Japanese it leaves 91–93% of string entropy to the coder and turns 2.16–6.85 times as much entropy into message bits as SyncPool at full vocabulary, with zero error.

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